




































































This paper derives analytical expressions for the revenue elasticity of the Spanish personal income 
tax system, as applied to tax units and in aggregate. This is complicated by the schedular nature of 
the system, and the role of central and regional governments, along with the existence of a range of 
tax credits and eligible expenditures and deductions. Empirical estimates are obtained using a 
cross-sectional dataset which enables a number of important ancillary elasticities (relating to 
allowances and tax credits, and different income sources) to be estimated. It was found that there is 
considerable variation among tax units in the revenue elasticity, with highly (positively) skewed 
distributions. The nature of the distributions varies among regions of Spain, and the aggregate 
elasticities for each region were found to display some variation associated with income 
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1  Introduction 
An important characteristic of any personal income tax structure is the elasticity of income tax 
revenue with respect to changes in gross income, when there are no adjustments to income 
thresholds or other discretionary changes to the tax structure. The revenue elasticity provides, at 
individual and aggregate levels, a measure of ‘fiscal drag’ arising from the failure to adjust income 
tax thresholds when incomes increase. Fiscal drag, or ‘built-in flexibility’, has implications for both 
the revenue and redistributive effects of taxation over the business cycle.
2 This measure is also 
useful when considering the ‘automatic stabilisation’ properties of the tax system.
3 The aim of this 
paper is to estimate the revenue elasticity properties of the Spanish personal income tax structure. 
Although the focus of attention is the Spanish structure, the methods used are more widely 
applicable.   
 
The Spanish tax system differs from that of many other countries and has undergone significant 
reforms, in additional to the type of base-broadening and rate-reducing changes which have been 
common in many other countries.
4 In particular, income taxation (since 2002) is shared between 
Central and Regional Governments, consisting of 15 autonomous regions within the Common 
Territory. In addition, different tax rates and thresholds, and other rules influencing the difference 
between gross and taxable income, apply to a range of income sources: this involves the use of a 
multi-schedular tax structure. There are numerous deductions, allowances and tax credits (at central 
and regional levels) which apply at various stages. A number of these elements depend on non-
income as well as income characteristics of tax units. This complexity means that extensions need 
to be made to standard methods of obtaining revenue elasticities.
5  
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The approach followed here is to derive an analytical expression for the revenue elasticity of tax 
units, with respect to changes in gross income. This is shown to depend on a number of ‘ancillary 
elasticities’ which affect the way in which eligible expenditures and deductions, and tax credits, 
vary with unit income, along with the relative movements of each income source. A large cross-
sectional sample of Spanish tax units is then used to estimate values of the ancillary elasticities, 
allowing for a substantial degree of heterogeneity whereby the elasticities differ according to total 
tax unit income, the demographic composition of the unit, the location (automonous region) and 
the income source. The aggregate revenue elasticity for each region and for the country as a whole 
is then obtained as a tax-share weighted sum of tax unit revenue elasticities, where the weights 
depend on the way in which each tax unit’s income changes when total income changes.  
 
Section 2 provides a description of the Spanish personal income tax system and formulates 
analytical expressions for the tax liability of each tax unit. Revenue elasticities relating to each tax 
unit are derived in Section 3, which also provides some numerical illustrations of their variation 
with tax unit income. Section 4 turns to the empirical estimation of revenue elasticities. First it 
obtains the distribution over tax units, using the ancillary elasticity estimates. Second, aggregate 
revenue elasticities for each region are reported. Section 4 also considers the potential implications 
of alternative income dynamic processes which allow ‘regression’ away from or towards the 
geometric mean income. Brief conclusions are given in Section 5.  
 
2  The Tax Structure 
This section describes the main elements of the personal income tax structure in Spain. The 
accounting period is the tax year, which corresponds to the calendar year.  Subsection 2.1 provides 
a basic description of the structure as it applies to an individual tax unit, where the unit may consist 
of single individuals or married couples who decide to file jointly. In view of the operation of tax 
credits, several special cases need to be distinguished, as discussed in subsection 2.2. 
2.1  Income Taxation of a Tax Unit 
Let  hi y  denote the gross income of tax unit h from source  1,..., iI  . In transforming from gross to 
taxable income, there are tax-deductible expenditures and non-income allowances. Let  hi E  denote 
the tax-deductible expenditure for unit h relating to source i. In general these expenditures are 4 
 
expected to be a function of gross income: this is examined in more detail below. Non-income 
allowances for tax unit h relating to source i are denoted  hi A . Taxable income,  hi x  is given by: 
    max 0, hi hi hi hi x yEA    (1) 
If the sum of actual tax-deductible expenditures and non-income allowances exceeds gross income 
for any income source, the unit effectively has ‘losses’ associated with that source.
6 A distinction 
can therefore be drawn between actual expenditures and those which are claimed in a year: in the 
following discussion,  hi E  refers to actual expenditures. A complication is that any ‘losses’ can be 
carried forward for a period of four years, to be deducted against future income for the same 
source. However, no allowance is made for this dynamic element on the grounds that the losses 
form a very small component of income.
7  
 
The income tax structure has marginal tax rates  ki t  and thresholds  ki a  for  1,..., kK  , where  ki t  
applies between  ki a  and  1, ki a   (with  1, Ki a   ).
8 In addition, as mentioned above, separate rates are 
imposed at the central and regional government levels, although the income thresholds are 
common. Letting superscripts C and R refer to central and regional rates respectively: 
 
CR
ki ki ki ttt    (2) 
For a multi-step tax structure with K steps,    0 Tx  for  01 0 ax a  ,     11 Tx tx a   for 
12 ax a , and       12 1 2 2 Tx ta a t x a     for  23 ax a   , and so on. Then in general, if 
1 kk ax a   , Creedy and Gemmell (2006, p. 25) show that: 
     ' kk Tx t x a  (3) 
where: 











   (4) 
                                                 
6 This creates a tax asymmetry similar to that associated with corporation taxation, where its role is much more 
significant. 
7 The amount of negative taxable income generated each tax year is well below 1 per cent. Furthermore, the amount of 
carried-forward taxable income from the last four years to offset against current taxable income is even less relevant in 
relative terms, being well below 0.1 per cent. As with corporation losses, many losses are not used by the taxpayers and 
becoming ‘stranded’. Hence, the loss asymmetry in the tax function is of little relevance in determining the aggregate 
tax liability. 
8 From 2007, there is an exception in that Madrid has a slightly different tax structure from that of the other regions. 
This minor difference is neglected here.  5 
 
Hence in the present context, if  1, ki hi k i axa   , unit h is in the kth tax bracket for source i and the 
following expressions describe income taxation at central and regional levels. 
     1, '
CC C
ih i k ih ik i k i h h i k i h Ty a x a txa      (5) 
     1, '
RR R
ih i k ih ik i k i h h i k i h Ty a x a txa      (6) 
The terms  '
C
ki a  and  '
R
ki a  are the corresponding thresholds such that tax liability in a multi-threshold 
tax structure can be expressed in terms of an equivalent single-rate structure. In writing the 
expressions (5) and (6) the marginal tax rate terms, t, along with the effective thresholds,  ' a , need 
the h subscripts, in order to clarify the point that the tax rates and thresholds indicated are those that 
apply to the tax unit in question, depending on the tax bracket into which the unit falls.  
 
In addition, there are central and regional government non-refundable tax credits of  C C  and  R C . 
Total tax paid by unit h is expressed as: 
 
11
() m a x 0 , ( ) m a x 0 , ( )
II
CR
hi i hi C i hi R
ii i
Ty T yC T yC

 
   
     (7) 
In addition, there are refundable tax credits, unrelated to income. However, it is argued that such 
refundable credits, since they can in principle be administered by a separate authority and their cost 
is unrelated to the income tax structure, should not be included where – as here – emphasis is on 
the revenue elasticity from the point of view of revenue growth and fiscal drag. This issue is 
discussed further in Appendix A. 
 
The existence of non-refundable tax credits means that several cases must be distinguished. These 
are discussed in the following subsection.  
2.2  Special Cases 

















  . The expression given in (7) above for tax liability is thus simplified to: 
   
1
( ) () ()
I
CR
hi i hi i hi R C
ii
Ty T yT y C C

     (8) 
and: 
   
1
() ( ' ' )
I
CC RR
hi kih hi kih kih kih kih R C
ii
T y tx ta ta C C

      (9) 6 
 
Furthermore, where  0 hi x   this becomes: 
    
1
() ( ' ' )
I
CC RR
hi kih hi hi hi kih kih kih kih R C
ii
T y t y E A ta ta C C

        (10) 
A further simplification is available in view of the fact that the central and regional income 
thresholds are the same. Using the above expression for  'k a , it can be shown that:  





kih kih kih kih ji ji j i
j
ta ta a t t 

    (11) 






















hi i hi C
ii
Ty T y C

   (12) 
and if  0 hi x   this becomes: 
   
1
() ( ' )
I
CC C
hi kih hi hi hi kih kih C
ii
Ty t y E A t a C

      (13) 





ki ki ji ji j i
j
ta a t t 

















  , the above 
expressions apply with C replaced by R.  
3  Individual Revenue Elasticities 
This section considers the tax revenue elasticity, measuring the extent to which tax revenue 
increases when gross income increases, at the level of the tax unit. 
Consider the effect on tax paid by a tax unit of a small increase in gross income, arising from 
changes in each of the sources, which does not take the unit into a higher tax bracket.
9 First, define 
() hi h
i
TyT    as the total tax paid by the unit. Furthermore, define  hh i
i
y y   as total gross 
income from all sources. 
 





i hh i h
dT T y
dy y y 
 

    (14) 
                                                 
9 It is common not to allow for such transitions when using analytical expressions. However, when using a simulation 
approach which actually computes discrete income and tax changes, considerable care is needed because very large 






hh h ih hh i
i hh hh i h ih
y dT y T y y
Td y T y y y 
  
        (15) 
In general denote the elasticity of A with respect to B using the notation  , AB  . Thus: 
  ,, ,
1
hh hh i h ih
I




  (16) 
The elasticity of total tax paid by unit h therefore depends on the way in which the individual 
components of income change when the unit’s total gross income changes, determined by  , hi h yy  .   
 
Consider the component elasticity  , hh i Ty  . Here it is not possible to obtain a component elasticity 
defined in terms of the revenue from a single source, because the non-refundable tax credits are 
related to total income tax rather than its components. If it were possible to distinguish revenue 
from each source, as for example  hi T , the elasticity  , hh Ty   could be expressed as a tax-share 
(/ hi h TT ) weighted sum of the product of individual elasticities  , hi hi Ty   and  , hi h yy  . 
 
For those with positive taxable incomes in excess of the tax credits, and supposing that eligible 









      
 (17) 
This can be rewritten: 
  , 1
hh q
hq kqh hq hq hq h
Ty
h hq h hq hq
y ty E A T
Ty T y y

  
       
 (18) 
 
The ratio  / hh q Ty  is the total tax paid by unit h as a proportion of h’s income from source q, which 
may be denoted by  'hq ATR : the prime is added here as it is not the averate rate associated with 
source q. It can thus be interpreted as a kind of average tax rate: if there were no distinction 
between income sources, it would be a standard average tax rate. The term  / hh q Ty   is the 
marginal tax rate,  hq MTR , relating to a change in income source q. The tax revenue elasticity for 
unit h with respect to a change in income source q is thus the ratio,  /' hq hq MTR ATR , as in the 
standard result. 
Then it can be seen that: 8 
 
  ,, , hh q h qh q h qh q
kqh hq kqh hq kqh hq






   
 
 (19) 
The term  / kqh hq h tE T  represents the tax ‘saved’ at the margin from the existence of the deduction, 
hq E , expressed as a ratio of total tax paid. Denote this by  , Eh q  . A similar term,  , Ah q  , can be 
defined relating to allowances. Furthermore, let  kqh hqh tM I T R  , where the subscript h is included as 
a reminder that the appropriate marginal rate depends on the specific situation facing the tax unit. 
The notation, including ‘I’, indicates that it is the marginal income tax rate, not the effective 
marginal tax rate,  / hh q Ty  . The elasticity can therefore be written: 
  ,, , , , '
hh q h qh q h qh q
hq




      (20) 
In the special case where  hq E  and  hq A  are fixed, so that  ,, 0 Eh q Ah q     , then of course 
hq hq kq MITR MTR t  .
10 
 
A further complication arises where the tax credits,  C C  and  R C , are not fixed, but depend on 
household characteristics. These credits are not connected with individual income sources, unlike 
the expenditures and allowances. Suppose instead that the tax credits depend on total income,  h y . 













               
 (21) 
 
Using the above property that  ,, ,
1
hh hh i h ih
I




 , defining  / hh h ATR T y   as the overall average 
tax rate facing the unit, and noting that 
1
,, hi h h hi yy y y 
   and, for example,  ,, , ab bc ac    ,it can be 
shown that, for those taxpayers with 
C
Ch CT   and 
R
Rh CT  : 
                                                 
10 The treatment of the relationship between allowances and income from each source is slightly simplified here and in 
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If there were only one income source, then  , /1
hi h hi h y y yy    and the first term above would be 
simply the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate facing the unit: this is the standard 
expression for the revenue elasticity. The second term shows the modifications arising from the 
eligible expenditures and allowances, which are involved in the transformation from gross to 
taxable income, and the central and regional tax credits. Special cases of this result apply for 
situations where tax credits are greater or equal than the tax liability after the application of the tax 
schedule.   
 
3.1  Illustrative Examples 
This subsection illustrates the way in which the tax revenue elasticity varies for individuals in 
Spain. Following the Spanish tax code operating in 2007, attention is concentrated on just two 
sources of income and on the effects of varying eligible expenditures, allowances and tax credits as 
gross income increases. The first income source includes: labour income; alimony; self 
employment income; income from property and income applications to shareholders coming from 
Corporations under the fiscal transparency regime (similar to S-Corporations in the USA). The 
second income source includes: capital gains and any form of income derived from financial 
savings such as interest rates from bank accounts and deposits, share dividends, bond interest or 
any other type of yield earned from debt saving instruments. Incomes include both monetary 
compensations and fringe benefits. 
 
The allowable tax deductions,E , are income related specific deductions which generally include a 
shortlist of necessary expenditures incurred in order to earn the relevant income. Good examples of 
this are the employee Social Security contributions and union membership fees for labour income, 10 
 
loan interest payments, maintenance costs or economic depreciation in the case of property income, 
or a restricted list of some operating expenses from savings or entrepreneurship. Together with this, 
E entails the existence of a fixed labour-specific tax deduction of 4,000 € for earnings less than or 
equal to 9,000 €. Notwithstanding, this tax deduction turns out to be income-decreasing for 
earnings between 9,000 € and 13,000 € and becoming fixed again at a reduced amount of 2,600 € 
for earnings of 13,000 € and above.  
 
Allowances,  A, incorporate non-specific tax allowances and deductions. This includes paid 
palimony, contributions to Pension Schemes and personal and family allowances. Examples of the 
latter are the allowances recognized for special circumstances such as age, disability or the 
existence of dependants (ancestors and/or descendants). These non-specific income allowances are 
normally capped and present some limitations for its application in terms of the taxpayer’s income 
level and type of income. Finally, tax credits include all non-refundable tax relief enjoyed by the 
taxpayers in order to compute the final tax due after applying the tax schedules. For a detailed 
description of the specific quantities applied in year 2007 see Agencia Tributaria (2008), and for an 
evolution of all these concepts through time in the Spanish case, see Romero and Sanz-Sanz 
(2007).  
 
The marginal rates and thresholds for the first income source are shown in Table 1. For the second 













0 0.1566  0.0834  0.24 
17,360 0.1827 0.0973 0.28 
32,360 0.2414 0.1286 0.37 
52,360 0.2713 0.1587 0.43 
 
Four different cases, for parameters listed in Table 2, are illustrated. In each case a fixed ratio of 
income from the two sources is assumed, whereby source two is 10 per cent of source one. Case 1 
takes the (unrealistic) extreme of fixed eligible expenses, allowances and credits. The following 
cases gradually introduce elasticities, assumed to be constant, so that Case 4 allows all deductions 11 
 
and credits to vary as income varies. For example, in obtaining the values of expenditures, and so 





hi hi EE y
   (24) 
The various elasticities, such as  , ii Ey  , are referred to here as ‘ancillary elasticities’, and their 
estimation for Spain is described in the following Section. For estimation purposes, a major aim 
was to allow for as much population heterogeneity as possible. For present illustrative purposes the 
parameters in Table 2 are imposed, based on orders of magnitude obtained for the estimates. 
 
Table 2  Alternative Parameters for Four Cases 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
Source  1      
E0  3500 98  98  98 
Elasticity 0  0.4  0.4  0.4 
A0  5000 5000 7000 7000 
Elasticity  0 0 0.005  0.005 
Source  2      
E0  35 0.3  0.3  0.3 
Elasticity 0  0.8  0.8  0.8 
A0  5000 5000 4750 4750 
Elasticity  0 0 0.05  0.05 
Credits      
CC0  1200 1200 1200 800 
Elasticity  0 0 0 0.05 
CR0 550 550 550 13 
Elasticity  0 0 0 0.4 
 
The resulting variations in individual revenue elasticities are shown in Figures 1 to 4. Clearly the 
highest elasticity values are obtained when expenditures, deductions and credits are fixed. Tax unit 
elasticities can become extremely high where income is just above the tax threshold where units 
begin to pay tax: in the limit – right at the threshold – the elasticity is of course infinitely high 
because the denominator (the initial tax paid) is zero. This property influences the distribution of 
elasticities discussed in the following Section. 
 
From Figure 1, no tax is paid until total income reaches approximately 16,775 €, when income 
from the first source becomes subject to the regional government rate of 0.0834 and income from 
the second source is taxed at the regional government rate of 0.069. At these levels, just above the 
threshold when the individual begins to pay tax, the revenue elasticity is very high. It then falls, 
until a total income of about 17,875 € is reached. At this point, the individual’s incomes from both 
sources are taxed at both the central government and regional rates, so that the marginal tax rates 12 
 
applying to sources one and two are 0.24 and 0.18 respectively. On crossing into the higher 
marginal tax rate brackets, the revenue elasticity shoots up again, after which it declines steadily 
until reaching the next threshold.  
 
When total income is about 28600 €, the marginal tax rate applied to income from the first source 
becomes 0.28 (the combined central and regional rates), and a smaller jump in the revenue 
elasticity is observed. The next income threshold is about 45,100 € when income from the first 
source begins to be taxed at a combined rate of 0.37. The effect is that the pattern of revenue 
elasticities displays the familiar ‘saw tooth’ pattern. 
 
Case 2, where positive ancillary elasticities are introduced for eligible expenditures, the pattern is 
similar to that for Case 1, although of course the effective income thresholds are different. Thus 
initially only regional government taxes are paid in relation to both income sources, then another 
threshold is reached where central government tax rates are also applied. The individual then 
gradually moves into the higher tax brackets relating to the first income source. Similar 
characteristics apply when, in Case 3, ancillary elasticities for allowances are also positive. 
 
 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Case 4, where all ancillary elasticities are positive, gives rise to a slightly different pattern. In this 
case the income level, of about 23,375 €, at which the individual begins to pay tax involves paying 
only the central government rates of 0.1566 and 0.111 for the first and second income source 
respectively. Very soon after this, at the level of 23,650 €, the individual pays tax on both income 
sources at the combined central and regional rates of 0.24 and 0.18 for the two sources. A kink, or 
‘tooth’ arises in the revenue elasticity curve at the income of 34,100 €, when income source one 
attracts the higher combined marginal tax rate of 0.28. Then at 51,700 €, the individual moves into 
the next tax bracket for this source, with a marginal rate of 0.37. Movement to the top marginal tax 
bracket is not shown in the diagram. 
4  Empirical Estimates 
This section presents estimated values of the individual revenue elasticity as defined in equation 
(23). Results were obtained using the Personal Income Tax information reported for a sample of 
896,390 Spanish tax units. The original dataset comes from a cross-sectional dataset from the 
Spanish Tax Agency for year 2002. The data were adjusted to tax year 2007 and the simulated 
personal income tax is the one that came into force in January 2007. Appendix C reports some 
basic summary statistics for relevant variables, both for the whole country and for each of the 
Autonomous Communities (regions). 
 15 
 
The first step was to compute the ancillary elasticities relating to the variation in expenditures and 
allowances. An important priority was to allow for as much heterogeneity as possible. For each of 
the 15 Autonomous Communities, the sample was split into subsamples according to 5 quantiles of 
total gross income, and within each quantile by the size of the tax unit. In the latter case three 
categories were used consisting of: one member; two members; and three or more members. 
Therefore, the total sample was divided into 225 subsamples (1 553   ), and for each of these 225 
subsamples the ancillary elasticities were obtained by running the following Tobit regression 
(where the sampling weight of each tax unit was taken into account): 
  , log log log hz y h h zy Q        (25) 
Where z is the relevant variable for which the constant elasticity,  , zy  , with respect to total gross 
income is required (that is,  12121 ,,,,, a n d CR y yEEA C C ), and the matrix Q represents a set of 
dummy variables capturing the type of tax-return (joint or separate filing), marital status (four 
categories) and type of main source of income (three categories).
11 As a consequence of the 
procedure described above 1,575 estimations were run (seven ancillary elasticities for each of the 
225 subgroups). Clearly there are too many values to be reported here. 
 
To compute the remaining terms in equation (23) for each tax unit, the 2007 tax structure was 
applied to each tax unit in the sample. For each tax unit the appropriate values of  1 y ,  2 y ,  t y ,  1 A , 
2 A ,  C C ,  r C and the marginal tax rates levied on each income source,  kih t , as well as the weighted 







 , and the average tax rate ( ATR). All the ingredients of 
h h y T  were thus available for each tax unit, and Summary measures of the distribution of 




                                                 
11 For the case of 
2 h Ay  the procedure was slightly different, as follows. The values of  2 A  are positive only if the 
magnitude of  1 A  has not been entirely absorbed by the first income source  1 y . In those cases, the excess of  1 A  can be 
transferred as an allowance to reduce the second source of income  2 y . Thus  2 A  is positive only for tax units for 
whom  1 y  is sufficiently small not to absorb all its entitled  1 A . In other words, tax units which are rich in income from 
source 1 will not enjoy any transfer and as a result they will have 0 2  A . 16 
 
Table 3  Quartiles of Individual Revenue Elasticities by Region and for The Whole 
Country 
   Lower quartile Median 
Upper 
quartile 
National 1.1214  1.4082  1.7761 
Andalucia 0.9673 1.3004  1.6172 
Aragon 1.1128  1.3819 1.8037 
Asturias 1.1414  1.4731  1.9418 
Baleares 1.0127  1.3865  1.9085 
Canarias 1.0207  1.3504  1.7578 
Cantabria 1.2341 1.5071  1.8395 
Castilla-Leon 1.0710  1.3829  1.7248 
Castilla-
LaMancha 1.0553  1.3905  1.7490 
Cataluña 1.1874  1.3660  1.6667 
Valencia 1.0806  1.3706  1.8863 
Extremadura 0.9384  1.3016  1.6013 
Galicia 0.9480  1.3297 1.8183 
Madrid 1.2896  1.5507 1.8279 
Murcia 1.1164  1.4429 1.9578 
Rioja 1.1214  1.4082  1.7761 
 
 
The distribution of individual revenue elasticities is of course highly skewed because those 
individuals who are just above an income threshold have very high revenue elasticities, as 
discussed in the previous Section.  
Further details regarding the distribution of individual elasticities can be illustrated using ‘box 
plots’, as in Figures 5 to 7, which provide a graphical representation of the main characteristics of a 
given distribution. A box plot is formed by a box, two ‘whiskers’ and two ‘fences’, as follows. The 
right border of the box is the upper quartile; the left border is the lower quartile; and the line inside 
the box is the median. Hence the width of the box shows the inter-quartile range. The whiskers are 
the two horizontal lines to the left and right of the box which end in two vertical lines known as the 
fences. The right fence shows the highest value of the distribution that is smaller than or equal to 
the third quartile plus 1.5 times the inter-quartile range. The left fence shows the lowest value of 
the distribution that is greater than or equal to the first quartile minus 1.5 times the inter-quartile 







Figure 5  Distribution of Individual Elasticities by Income Quintile and Size of Tax Unit: 
All Regions 
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Figure 6  Distribution of Individual Elasticities by Main Income and Marital Status: All 
Regions 
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Figure 7  Distribution of Individual Elasticities by Autonomous Community in Common 
Territory 









































The boxes on the left hand side of each figure refer to all tax units, and thus include all those with a 
zero tax liability. When the elasticities are classified by income quintiles, it can be seen that there 
are nurerous negative elasticities, many of which are large in absolute terms. These negative 
elasticities are associated mainly with tax units who pay small amounts of personal income tax but 
have low incomes and ancillary elasticities which are greater than unity; thus (some of) the eligible 
expenditures, allowances and tax credits increase by more than gross income. The dispersion is 
substantially affected by whether all tax units are included, or whether attention is restricted to 
those who pay positive amounts of personal income tax. 
 
When classified by tax unit size, there is little variation in the dispersion of individual revenue 
elasticities. Those whose main source of income is entrepreneurial income have a lower dispersion 
when only taxpayers are included, compared with the population of all tax units. This result is 
affected by the great ability of such tax units to claim substantial amounts of eligible expenditure 
and allowances.   
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4.1  The Aggregate Revenue Elasticity 
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and: 












   (27) 
The elasticity of aggregate revenue with respect to aggregate income is thus a tax-share weighted 
average of the product of individual revenue elasticities and the elasticity of individual income with 
respect to total income. Hence it depends not only the tax structure but on the extent to which 
individual incomes change when aggregate income changes. And, as shown above, the individual 
revenue elasticities depend on the extent to which the components of individuals’ incomes change 
as each individual’s income changes.  
 
In order to show the relevance of taking into account the schedular design of the tax as well as the 
rules that affect the definition of the taxable income and the final tax due, it is of interest to 
consider alternative measures of the aggregate revenue elasticity. Allowing for progressively more 
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Table 4  Aggregate Revenue Elasticities:  , 1
h yY    
   1    2    3    4   
National  2.0732 2.1010 1.6238 1.3516 
Andalucía  2.2403 2.2444 1.6813 1.2231 
Aragón  2.1577 2.0983 1.5823 1.3266 
Asturias  2.1926 2.2358 1.7334 1.4369 
Baleares  2.0425 2.0047 1.5878 1.3282 
Canarias  2.1566 2.1250 1.6885 1.3235 
Cantabria  2.1645 2.1011 1.5900 1.3164 
Castilla-León  2.2493 2.2275 1.5390 1.2051 
Castilla-La  Mancha  2.3570 2.3310 1.7721 1.2842 
Cataluña  1.9944 1.9501 1.5615 1.3668 
Valencia  2.1714 2.1569 1.6281 1.3026 
Extremadura  2.3600 2.2622 1.6661 1.0762 
Galicia  2.1924 2.1721 1.6028 1.1985 
Madrid  1.8614 2.0515 1.6300 1.5057 
Murcia  2.2954 2.2725 1.8047 1.3189 
Rioja  2.1905 2.1212 1.6275 1.3665 
 
 
In obtaining results reported here, the assumption was made that  , h yY   is unity; that is, all incomes 
move in the same proportion.The resulting aggregate elasticities are shown in Table 4. The 
elasticity  1   assumes not only that all deductions and credits are fixed irrespective of income, but 
that the two sources of income remain in fixed proportions for all individuals. The second 
elasticity,  2  , uses information about the (cross-sectional) variation in income proportions to 
attribute an elasticity  , hi h yy   to each tax unit’s income source. This has a relatively small effect on 
the revenue elasticity estimates. Larger effects are observed where eligible expenditures and 
deductions, and then tax credits, vary with tax unit income: in each case the aggregate revenue 
elasticity falls when the ancillary elasticities are used.  
 
The revenue elasticities in the final column of Table 4 vary from just over 1.0 to about 1.5. The 
variation across regions arises from regional differences in gross incomes, since all regions face 
similar tax structures.   
 
In general, the aggregate values are similar to those reported for a number of other countries. On 
the US, see Fries et al. (1982), Dye and McGuire (1991) and Ram(1991). UK results are reported 
in Johnson and Lambert (1989) and Creedy and Gemmell (2004a, 2006, pp. 113). Canadian 21 
 
estimates are given by King and McMorran (2002)
12, and for New Zealand see Creedy and 
Gemmell (2004b, 2006, p.171). Lower elasticities of around 1, using time series methods, are given 
for Turkey by Kuştepeli and Şapçi (2006).  
 
In considering the revenue elasticities reported above, it should be remembered that they relate to 
revenue changes associated with changes in gross incomes. Many empirical studies actually begin 
not from gross income but from taxable income; that is, measured income has already been 
adjusted for eligible expenditures and allowances, so that the tax function can be applied directly as 
a function of taxable income.  
 
In the case of a single income source, where x and y are, as above, taxable and gross income, and 
tax paid is    Txy , then the revenue elasticity is     ,, , Ty Tx xy   
. 
 Furthermore, writing 
x yD , where D refers to all allowances and deductions, it can be shown that: 
 
1






    
  
 (31) 
Where  , D y   is the elasticity of deductions with respect to gross income. It is clear from (33) that if 
, 1 Dy   , then  , 1 xy    and the revenue elasticity with respect to gross income exceeds the revenue 
elasticity with respect to taxable income.  
4.2  Income Dynamics 
The above estimates, in common with most studies, are obtained on the assumption that all 
incomes move together, so that  , h yY   is equal to unity. In the absence of direct information on the 
dynamic process of relative income changes from year to year, it is possible to consider the 
sensitivity of results to an assumed degree of regression towards, or away from, the geometric 
mean. Following Creedy and Gemmell (2006), suppose income dynamics can be described by the 
relationship: 
       , 11 l o g l o g
h yY h yE y      (32) 
where   log E y  is the mean log-income, or equivalently the logarithm of geometric mean income. 
The coefficient,  , therefore governs systematic movements within the income distribution. If 
                                                 
12 They found a large variation between 1994 and 1998 of between 1.8 and 2.9, but judged the ‘underlying’ value to be 
1.4. For medium term revenue forecasting, they proposed values in the range 1 to 1.3.  22 
 
1    there are systematic equalising relative movements whereby those below the geometric mean 
income experience relative larger increases than those above the geometric mean, when total 
income increases. A value of  1    implies systematic disequalising income movements. The 
effects on aggregate revenue elasticities of differential income changes are shown in Tables 5 and 
6, which may be compared with Table 4.  
 
Table 5  Aggregate Elasticities:  0.9    
   1    2    3    4   
National  1.9480 1.9712 1.5054 1.2198 
Andalucia  2.1274 2.1296 1.5763 1.0999 
Aragon  2.0504 1.9930 1.4908 1.2216 
Asturias  2.0856 2.1240 1.6314 1.3162 
Baleares  1.9115 1.8804 1.4735 1.1989 
Canarias  2.0382 2.0046 1.5786 1.2075 
Cantabria  2.0536 1.9801 1.4814 1.1933 
Castilla-Leon 2.1476 2.1293 1.4575 1.1062 
Castilla-LaMancha  2.2517 2.2303 1.6850 1.1769 
Cataluña  1.8706 1.8327 1.4545 1.2495 
Valencia  2.0523 2.0371 1.5170 1.1748 
Extremadura  2.2580 2.1673 1.5848 0.9714 
Galicia  2.0775 2.0660 1.5045 1.0815 
Madrid  1.7203 1.8873 1.4778 1.3467 
Murcia  2.1804 2.1536 1.6966 1.1882 
Rioja  2.0842 2.0290 1.5471 1.2705 
 
 
Table 6  Aggregate Elasticities:  1.1    
   1    2    3    4   
Nacional  2.1984 2.2309 1.7422 1.4834 
Andalucia  2.3532 2.3593 1.7862 1.3462 
Aragon  2.2650 2.2037 1.6737 1.4317 
Asturias  2.2995 2.3477 1.8353 1.5577 
Baleares  2.1735 2.1290 1.7022 1.4575 
Canarias  2.2750 2.2455 1.7985 1.4396 
Cantabria  2.2755 2.2222 1.6986 1.4395 
Castilla-Leon  2.3510 2.3257 1.6205 1.3040 
Castilla-LaMancha  2.4623 2.4318 1.8592 1.3914 
Cataluña  2.1181 2.0675 1.6686 1.4841 
Valencia  2.2905 2.2766 1.7392 1.4305 
Extremadura  2.4620 2.3570 1.7474 1.1810 
Galicia  2.3074 2.2783 1.7011 1.3154 
Madrid  2.0024 2.2157 1.7822 1.6647 
Murcia  2.4103 2.3914 1.9128 1.4496 
Rioja  2.2968 2.2134 1.7080 1.4625 23 
 
It can be shown that the elasticity varies linearly with  , as can be seen by substituting (31) into 
(27), whereby: 
     ,, ,
11











      
    (33) 
Although no direct evidence is available here, it is unlikely that   deviates far from unity. For 
example, a value of  0.9    would be considered low, implying for example that if total income 
were to increase by 10 per cent, the lower quartile would increase by about 14 per cent whereas the 
upper quartile would increase by only about 3 per cent. This implies considerable ‘regression 
towards the (geometric) mean’.
13  
 
The increase in the revenue elasticity as   increases is associated with the resulting rise in income 
inequality as those below the geometric mean experience relatively smaller percentage income 
increases. The larger proportion of the population just above the lower income thresholds implies 
an increase in the number of tax units having larger revenue elasticities. The decline in the 
elasticities associated with the higher income groups is relatively small, as can be seen from the 
shapes of the elasticity profiles shown above. Hence, in aggregate the revenue elasticity increases 
with  . 
  
5  Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to derive analytical expressions for the revenue elasticity of the Spanish 
personal income tax system as applied to tax units and in aggregate. This was considerably 
complicated by the schedular nature of the system, the role of central and regional governments, 
along with the existence of a range of tax credits and eligible expenditures and deductions.  
 
Empirical estimates of revenue elasticities were obtained using a large cross-sectional data set 
which enabled a number of important ancillary elasticities (relating to allowances and tax credits, 
and different income sources) to be estimated. The functional relationship between gross income 
and personal income taxation was examined, rather than starting from a given distribution of 
taxable income.  
 
                                                 
13 Random variations in proportional income changes, in addition to the systematic regression, can – if sufficiently 
large – lead to an increase in overall inequality; see Creedy (1985).  24 
 
It was found that there is considerable variation among tax units in the revenue elasticity, with 
highly (positively) skewed distributions. Similarly, the aggregate elasticities for each region were 
found to vary, associated with variations in the income distributions. Variations were around a 




Appendix A. The Treatment of Allowances 
This appendix considers refundable and non-refundable tax allowances. Suppose there is a simple 
tax structure with a marginal rate of t applied to income, y in excess of a, and there is a ‘refundable 
tax credit’ of b. The term ‘refundable’ means that if income tax is less than b, the individual 
receives a payment (pays negative tax). The net tax paid is 
     Ty ty a b    (B1) 
The total expenditure on the refundable tax credit b remains fixed, so long as the population size is 
fixed. Those with incomes between a and  / ab t   pay some income tax but face an overall 
negative average tax rate.  
 
For taxpayers, net income is   1 yt a t b  and the tax-free threshold can be regarded as giving 
rise to a kind of tax credit worth at. This is a ‘non-refundable tax credit’, such that those with y<a 
receive nothing.   
 
The non-refundable credit is intimately connected with the income tax structure. It determines who 
pays a zero marginal income tax rate, and the size of the ‘non-refundable credit’ is determined by 
the tax rate as well as a. The total ‘tax expenditure’ associated with the threshold a varies as the tax 
rate and the income distribution changes: it increases as the number of people above the threshold 
increases.  
 






















Hence for those with positive net average tax rates, the elasticity is higher when b is included 
(essentially because it lowers their average tax rate). A higher value of the refundable tax credit b 
has the effect of raising the revenue elasticity.  
 26 
 
Alternatively, it is possible simply to think of the two components of the structure separately. It 
could be said to combine an income tax with a tax-free threshold, and an unconditional transfer 
payment that is unrelated to income. Indeed, the refundable tax credit could be administered, 
without any change in net incomes, by an entirely separate agency and could be given a name (such 
as a ‘basic income’, or ‘grant’) that is unrelated to income taxation. In contrast, it would not be 
possible to separate the non-refundable tax credit from the income tax system. 
 









       
 (B4) 
as conventionally obtained.  
 
If interest is in using the revenue elasticity at a given income level as an indication of overall 
progressivity of taxes and transfers, then the refundable tax credit clearly increases progressivity of 
the tax and transfer system as a whole. Perhaps it is then desirable to include both components.
14 
But if concern is with the effect on tax revenue of inflation – fiscal drag – then it can be argued that 
allowance should be made only for non-refundable tax credits, and not refundable credits which, as 
suggested above, can be entirely separated from the income tax system, both conceptually and 
administratively. 
                                                 
14 However, measures of progressivity based on the Gini measure, such as Kakwani’s measure of disproportionality, 
could not be produced because the Gini is not defined for negative values 27 
 
 Appendix B. Summary Statistics for Spanish Regions 
 
Table 7  Basic Statistics for Key Tax Variables for Whole Country and for 
each Autonomous Community 
WHOLE COUNTRY        1.ANDALUCIA          
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2938 0.0771  0.43 
1 kh t   0.2818 0.0712  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1527 0.0646  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1424 0.0731  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2871 0.0712  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2775 0.0656  0.43 
h ATR   0.1235 0.0923  0.43 
h ATR   0.1040 0.0878  0.43 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1503 0.1012  0.43  * _ h ATR TI   0.1277 0.0979  0.43 
1 hh y y   0.9259 0.1902  1 
1 hh y y   0.9374 0.1841  1 
2 hh y y   0.0716 0.1846  1 
2 hh y y   0.0587 0.1744  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2588 0.1665  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2720 0.1776  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0038 0.0262  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0021 0.0221  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0604 0.1084  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0783 0.1228  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0087 0.0858  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0095 0.0898  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0615 0.0302  0.2612 
Ch h Cy   0.0640 0.0303  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0325 0.0161  0.1293 
Rh h Cy   0.0339 0.0162  0.0834 
2.ARAGÓN           3.ASTURIAS          
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2862 0.0721  0.43 
1 kh t   0.2853 0.0712  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1658 0.0485  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1544 0.0629  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2788 0.0657  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2803 0.0650  0.43 
h ATR   0.1161 0.0820  0.42 
h ATR   0.1136 0.0835  0.42 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1443 0.0922  0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1427 0.0935  0.42 
1 hh y y   0.9048 0.2055  1 
1 hh y y   0.9236 0.1982  1 
2 hh y y   0.0941 0.2034  1 
2 hh y y   0.0736 0.1921  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2519 0.1627  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2668 0.1812  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0066 0.0323  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0041 0.0252  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0540 0.0992  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0593 0.1044  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0114 0.0980  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0115 0.0988  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0613 0.0300  0.1566 
Ch h Cy   0.0598 0.0311  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0324 0.0160  0.0834 
Rh h Cy   0.0318 0.0167  0.0834 








Table 8  Basic Statistics for Key Tax Variables for Whole Country and for 




   5.CANARIAS 
 
  
 Mean  Std_Dev  Max   Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2935 0.0776 0.43 
1 kh t   0.2924 0.0746  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1618 0.0543 0.18 
2 kh t   0.1171 0.0858  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2870 0.0715 0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2886 0.0689  0.43 
h ATR   0.1269 0.0936 0.42 
h ATR   0.1188 0.0866  0.42 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1532 0.1019 0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1449 0.0960  0.42 
1 hh y y   0.9323 0.1798  1 
1 hh y y   0.9575 0.1540  1 
2 hh y y   0.0648 0.1728  1 
2 hh y y   0.0396 0.1452  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2574 0.1589  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2674 0.1665  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0027 0.0180  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0020 0.0202  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0435 0.0907  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0591 0.1044  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0077 0.0827  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0045 0.0622  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0628 0.0300  0.1566 
Ch h Cy   0.0619 0.0293  0.2612 
Rh h Cy   0.0332 0.0160  0.0834 
Rh h Cy   0.0328 0.0156  0.1286 
CANTABRIA 
 
    7. CASTILLA Y LEÓN     
 Mean  Std_Dev  Max   Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2938 0.0771 0.43 
1 kh t   0.2808 0.0688  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1527 0.0646 0.18 
2 kh t   0.1621 0.0539  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2871 0.0712 0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2751 0.0634  0.43 
h ATR   0.1235 0.0923 0.43 
h ATR   0.1062 0.0811  0.42 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1503 0.1012 0.43  * _ h ATR TI   0.1328 0.0921  0.42 
1 hh y y   0.9259 0.1902  1 
1 hh y y   0.9029 0.2126  1 
2 hh y y   0.0716 0.1846  1 
2 hh y y   0.0951 0.2087  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2588 0.1665  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2507 0.1702  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0038 0.0262  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0056 0.0299  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0604 0.1084  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0673 0.1167  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0087 0.0858  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0121 0.1018  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0615 0.0302  0.2612 
Ch h Cy   0.0638 0.0311  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0325 0.0161  0.1293 
Rh h Cy   0.0337 0.0167  0.0834 






Table 9  Basic Statistics for Key Tax Variables for Whole Country and for 




     9.CATALUÑA 
  
    
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2754 0.0668  0.43 
1 kh t   0.3021 0.0798  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1571 0.0600  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1633 0.0522  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2708 0.0614  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2939 0.0736  0.43 
h ATR   0.0943 0.0820  0.41 
h ATR   0.1361 0.0917  0.43 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1179 0.0935  0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1650 0.0998  0.43 
1 hh y y   0.9252 0.1901  1 
1 hh y y   0.9183 0.1937  1 
2 hh y y   0.0728 0.1857  1 
2 hh y y   0.0802 0.1905  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2638 0.1692  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2453 0.1543  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0036 0.0289  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0046 0.0289  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0899 0.1381  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0437 0.0872  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0120 0.1009  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0079 0.0821  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0650 0.0302  0.1566 
Ch h Cy   0.0594 0.0298  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0343 0.0162  0.0834 
Rh h Cy   0.0313 0.0159  0.0834 
10.COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA 
  
   11. EXTREMADURA      
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2848 0.0730  0.43 
1 kh t   0.2729 0.0650  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1502 0.0669  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1571 0.0600  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2779 0.0673  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2687 0.0613  0.43 
h ATR   0.1116 0.0883  0.42 
h ATR   0.0907 0.0821  0.40 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1370 0.0977  0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1125 0.0938  0.41 
1 hh y y   0.9254 0.1860  1 
1 hh y y   0.9321 0.1820  1 
2 hh y y   0.0723 0.1805  1 
2 hh y y   0.0657 0.1765  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2739 0.1669  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2786 0.1801  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0035 0.0251  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0020 0.0178  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0583 0.1055  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0951 0.1435  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0073 0.0782  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0108 0.0952  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0631 0.0292  0.1938 
Ch h Cy   0.0645 0.0305  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0334 0.0156  0.1090 
Rh h Cy   0.0342 0.0164  0.0834 





Table 10  Basic Statistics for Key Tax Variables for Whole Country and for 
each Autonomous Community (Continued) 
12.GALICIA 
  
      13.MADRID 
  
     
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2831 0.0715  0.43 
1 kh t   0.3167 0.0836  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1474 0.0693  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1508 0.0663  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2772 0.0658  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.3078 0.0784  0.43 
h ATR   0.1085 0.0864  0.42 
h ATR   0.1558 0.0996  0.43 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1342 0.0968  0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1849 0.1054  0.43 
1 hh y y   0.9268 0.1911  1 
1 hh y y   0.9300 0.1852  1 
2 hh y y   0.0695 0.1827  1 
2 hh y y   0.0680 0.1803  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2693 0.1763  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2388 0.1508  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0033 0.0269  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0042 0.0258  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0676 0.1243  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0465 0.0880  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0089 0.0860  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0063 0.0738  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0637 0.0317  0.2248 
Ch h Cy   0.0564 0.0294  0.1612 
Rh h Cy   0.0338 0.0170  0.1293 
Rh h Cy   0.0297 0.0156  0.0834 
14.MURCIA 
  
      15.RIOJA 
  
     
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2805 0.0712  0.43 
1 kh t   0.2827 0.0714  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1463 0.0703  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1653 0.0493  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2758 0.0652  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2748 0.0647  0.43 
h ATR   0.1000 0.0866  0.41 
h ATR   0.1117 0.0818  0.39 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1234 0.0970  0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1377 0.0913  0.42 
1 hh y y   0.9358 0.1819  1 
1 hh y y   0.8966 0.2168  1 
2 hh y y   0.0615 0.1754  1 
2 hh y y   0.1020 0.2143  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2828 0.1795  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2474 0.1674  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0025 0.0225  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0064 0.0316  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0680 0.1125  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0545 0.1031  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0098 0.0900  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0126 0.1023  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0647 0.0295  0.1566 
Ch h Cy   0.0629 0.0302  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0343 0.0158  0.0834 
Rh h Cy   0.0332 0.0161  0.0834 




Agencia Tributaria (2008). Manual Práctico Renta y Patrimonio 2007. Ministerio de 
Economía y Hacienda. 
Caminada, K. and Goudswaard, K. (1996) Progression and revenue effects of income 
tax reform. International Tax and Public Finance, 3, pp. 57-66. 
Craig, E.D. and Heins, A.J. (1980) The effect of tax elasticity on government 
spending. Public Choice, 35, pp. 267-275. 
Creedy, J. (1985) Dynamics of Income Distribution. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Creedy, J. (1996) Fiscal Policy and Social Welfare: An Analysis of Alternative Tax 
and Transfer Systems. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
Creedy, J. and Gemmell, N. (2002) The built-in flexibility of income and 
consumption taxes: a survey. Journal of Economic Surveys, 14, pp. 509-532. 
Creedy, J. and Gemmell, N. (2004a) The revenue responsiveness of income and 
consumption taxes in the UK. Fiscal Studies, 25, pp. 55-77. 
Creedy, J. and Gemmell, N. (2004b) The built-in flexibility of income and 
consumption taxes in New Zealand. Australian Economic Papers, 43, pp. 459-
474. 
Creedy, J. and Gemmell, N. (2006) Modelling Tax Revenue Growth. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Dye, R.F. and McGuire, T.J. (1991) Growth and variability of state individual income 
and general sales taxes. National Tax Journal, 44, pp. 55-66. 
Fries, A., Hutton, J.P. and Lambert, P.J. (1982) The elasticity of the US individual 
income tax: its calculation, determinants and behaviour. Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 64, pp. 147-151. 
Greytak, D. and Thursby, J. (1979) Functional form in state income tax elasticity 
estimation. National Tax Journal, 32, pp. 195-200. 
Heinemann, F. (2001) After the death of inflation: will fiscal drag survive? Fiscal 
Studies, 22, pp. 527-546. 
Hutton, J.P. (1980) Income tax elasticity and the distribution of income, with an 
application to Peninsular Malaysia. South East Asia Economic Review, 1, pp. 
13-34. 33 
 
Hutton, J.P. and Lambert, P.J. (1980) Evaluating income tax revenue elasticities. 
Economic Journal, 90, pp. 901-906. 
Hutton, J.P. and Lambert, P.J. (1982a) Modelling the effects of income growth and 
discretionary change on the sensitivity of U.K. income tax revenue. Economic 
Journal, 92, pp. 145-155. 
Hutton, J.P. and Lambert, P.J. (1982b) Simulating the revenue elasticity of an 
individual income tax. Economic Letters, 9, pp. 175-179. 
Hutton, J.P. and Lambert, P.J. (1983) Inequality and revenue elasticity in tax reform. 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 30, pp. 221-234. 
Johnson, P. and Lambert, P. (1989) Measuring the revenue responsiveness of income 
tax revenue to income growth: a review and some UK values. Fiscal Studies, 
10, pp. 1-18. 
King, P. and McMorran, R. (2002) Understanding personal income tax revenue 
fluctuations. Canadian Department of Finance Working Paper, 2002-07. 
Kuştepeli, Y. and Şapçi, O. (2006) Personal income tax elasticity in Turkey 1975 -
2005. Dokuz Eylul University Department of Economics Discussion Paper, 
06/01. 
Mabbett, D. (2004) Fiscal stabilisers in Europe: the macroeconomic impact of tax and 
benefit systems. Euromod Working Paper, no. EM7/04. 
Misiolek, W.S. and Elder, H.W. (1988) Tax structure and the size of government: an 
empirical analysis of the fiscal illusion and fiscal stress arguments. Public 
Choice, 57, pp. 233-245. 
Musgrave, R.A. and Thin, T. (1948) Income tax progression. Journal of Political 
Economy, 56, pp. 498-514. 
OECD (2006) Fundamental Reform of Personal Income Tax. OECD Tax Policy 
Studies No.13. 
Özmucur, S. (1979) More on built-in flexibility of taxation. Public Finance, 34, pp. 
443-451. 
Podder, N. (1997) Tax elasticity, income redistribution and the measurement of tax 
progressivity. In Research on Economic Inequality, Vol. 7. (ed. by S. 
Zandvakili), pp. 39-60. Greenwich: JAI Press. 
Pohjola, M. (1985) Built-in flexibility of progressive taxation and the dynamics of 
income: stability, cycles, or chaos? Public Finance, 40, pp. 263-273. 34 
 
Ram, R. (1991) Elasticity of individual income tax in the United States: Further 
evidence from cross-section data. National Tax Journal, 44, pp. 93-99. 
Romero, D. and Sanz-Sanz, J.F. (2007). Personal income taxation: the cornerstone of 
the tax system in a democracy. In Fiscal Reform in Spain. Accomplishments 
and Challenges (ed. by J. Martínez-Vazquez and J.F. Sanz-Sanz), pp. 151-
207. Studies in Fiscal Federalism and State-Local Finance. Cheltenham: 
Edward-Elgar. 
van den Noord, P. (2000) The size and role of automatic fiscal stabilizers in the 1990s 
and beyond. OECD Economics Department 